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B. SUPPLY: KNOWN DIFFERENCES 
C. SUPPLY: IMPLICIT DIFFERENCE 




In the 2017 edition of this journal, the author deployed1 a law and finance approach2 to 
attracting more external finance to Scotland. The author established a transaction cost 
framework3 for future commercial law reforms. The author argued that, in a corporate 
setting, the two relevant sources of external finance are debt or equity, and applied that 
framework to debt finance only. Equity finance was ignored as “laws in respect of the 
constitution of corporate vehicles and capital markets are the same.”4 Whilst there are 
 
*Lecturer in International Commercial Law, Edinburgh School of Law. I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewer for their comments. All errors and omissions remain the sole 
responsibility of the author.  
1 J Hardman, “Some Legal Determinants of External Finance in Scotland: A Response to 
Lord Hodge” (2017) 21(1) EdinLR 30. 
2 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and R W Vishny, “Law and finance” (1998) 
106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113; R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and R 
W Vishny, “Legal determinants of external finance” (1997) 52(3) Journal of Finance 1131; R 
Haslemann, K Pistor and V Vig, “How law affects lending” (2010) 23(2) The Review of 
Financial Studies 549. 
3 R H Coase, “The problems of social cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1; P Schlag, “The problem 
of transaction costs” (1989) 62 Southern Carolina Law Review 1661; A M Pacces and L 
Visscher, “Methodology of Law and Economics” in B van Klink and S Taekema (eds), Law 
and Method. Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011) at 85-107. 
4 Hardman (n 1) at 42. 
minor differences between the two jurisdictions, the academic conventional wisdom is that 
English and Scottish company law mostly align.5 Grier’s Company Law even states: 
To take account of the increasing dominance of English law, this book will frequently 
refer to English law. While technically many English cases may not be binding on Scots 
law, it is clearly pointless for a small island to have widely diverging commercial/legal 
practices depending on which side of the Tweed one may happen to be, and 
consequently much regard is paid to English cases. This book will follow this precept.6 
But if this is the conventional wisdom, is it correct? Recent research has identified that 
the Scottish corporate form is in trouble. Only five Scottish companies currently listed on 
the London Stock Exchange have been admitted to the exchange since 15 September 2008,7 
the date that Lehman Brothers collapsed.8 By way of comparison, 539 English companies 
have been admiteed to the exchange since such date. Evidence shows that 36% of Scottish 
non-investment companies9 have their headquarters in England. On the other hand, only 
 
5 English texts differentiate Scots law only where areas of explicit difference apply, leaving the 
implication of unity between company law elsewhere (E.g. P L Davies and S Worthington, 
Gower Principles of Modern Company Law, 10th edn (2016) at para 2-9, footnote 19; G Morse 
et al (eds), Palmer’s Company Law, release 163 (2019) at para 13-410). Moore has stated “The 
UK by contrast, in spite of being comprised of two traditionally autonomous legal systems and 
four separate national legislatures today, nonetheless by and large exhibits a unitary corporate 
law system” - M T Moore, “Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations 
of Corporate Contractarianism” (2014) 34 OJLS 693 at 709. Scots texts make similar 
statements, e.g. D Bennett, “Companies”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2013) at para 1.  
6 N Grier, Company Law, 5th edn (2020) at para 1-29. 
7 J Hardman, “The Slow Death of the Scottish Company Listed in London: An Empirical 
Study” JBL (forthcoming); [dataset] J Hardman, “UK Companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange as at 30 June 2020 by jurisdiction”, 2020 available at 
https://doi.org/10.7488/ds/2898. 
8 See C Hofmann, “Central bank collateral and the Lehman collapse” (2011) 6 CMLJ 456; A 
Ewins, C Husted, J Lee and J Woo, “The Lehman Aftermath: Hong Kong and Singapore 
Regulatory Reforms in the Structured Product Markets World” (2010) 5 CMLJ 301. 
9 This was measured by membership of the Association of Investment Companies - available 
at https://www.theaic.co.uk/aic/find-compare-investment-companies. Investment companies 
were excluded because they are likely to have no employees nor permanent operations 
independent of their manager – see Davies and Worthington (n 5) at paras 6.18-6.19. 
c0.5% of English companies have their headquarters in Scotland. Worse, since the date of 
the Lehman Brothers collapse, more Scottish headquartered companies incorporated in 
England and Wales have had their shares admitted to the London Stock Exchange than 
Scottish headquartered companies incorporated in Scotland.10  
In addition, it is possible that there is a fundamental theoretical difference in the origin 
of corporate legal personality between English and Scots law. The legal fiction/state gift 
theory11 appears (despite previous arguments to the contrary12) dominant in England.13 This 
holds that separate corporate legal personality is a legal fiction, whose boundaries are set by 
the state. Conversely, the real entity theory14 applies north of the Tweed.15 This holds that 
separate corporate legal personality arises organically. The origin of separate legal 
personality identifies the locus of the state to intervene in the activities of the company. If 
corporate separate legal personality arises by way of a gift from the state, then the state’s 
locus for intervention is higher than if it arises organically.16 As such, the state needs less 
justification to intervene in the workings of companies if their personality arises by way of 
gift from the state. Extrapolations from these theoretical positions could result in doctrinal 
 
10 Hardman (n 7) at section 3(C)(ii). 
11 R Harris, “The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: 
From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Business” (2006) 63 
Wash&LeeLR 1421; H Hansmann and R Kraakman, “The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law” (2000) 110 YaleLJ 387. 
12 F W Maitland, “The Corporation Sole” (1900) 16 LQR 355; F W Maitland, “The Crown as 
Corporation” (1901) LQR 131; F Pollock, “Has the Common Law Received the Fiction 
Theory of Corporations” (1911) 27 LQR 219. 
13 S M Watson, “The Corporate Legal Person” (2019) 19 (1) JCLS 137. 
14 J E Friedlander, “Corporations and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal Fiction” (1996) 
31 ConnLRev 31 at 78; Harris (n 11) at 1425. 
15 J Hardman, “Reconceptualsing Scottish Limited Partnership Law” (2020) JCLS. DOI: 
10.1080/14735970.2020.1803784. 
16 P G Mahoney, “Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law” 
(2000) 34 GaLR 873; Friedlander (n 14). 
company law differences between the two legal systems being more material than previous 
acknowledged. 
The purpose of this article is to explore whether there could be any company law 
reasons for the decline of the Scottish listed company: in other words, the equity aspect of 
external finance. Listing rules apply equally to all companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, regardless of their jurisdiction of incorporation.17 There are no restrictions 
between the activities of companies intra-UK: a Scottish company and an English company 
can both freely trade within the UK, and trade on the same terms external to the UK.18 
Accordingly, any legal causes for the comparative decline of Scottish companies being 
listed in London must arise due to company laws.19 Company law concepts frequently derive 
from private law concepts. As such, we need to examine these company law concepts and 
the private law concepts from which they derive. This article will therefore explore 
differences between English and Scottish company law (often extrapolated from private law 
concepts), whether these have an impact on transaction costs between the parties, and 
whether these could lead to the Scottish corporate form being eschewed for the English 
company.  
This conception of company law driving jurisdiction of incorporation is not novel. In 
the US, a large body of literature has developed based on a conception of a “market for 
incorporations”. This concept follows the observation that parties can incorporate their 
 
17 See Listing Rules (available at https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf), Rules 
1.1.1 and 1.4. 
18 Accordingly it is not a driver of intra-UK legal competition – see discussion in Part B. 
19 For discussion of the interaction between listing rules and non-domestic company laws see 
I MacNeil and A Lau, “International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas 
Companies” (2001) 50(4) ICLQ 787; B R Cheffins, “The Undermining of UK Corporate 
Governance (?)” (2013) 33(3) OJLS 503. 
company in any jurisdiction they like.20 As such, there forms a “market” for incorporations 
as shareholders and directors choose the jurisdiction which best meets their needs – the act 
of incorporating somewhere is akin to purchasing that jurisdiction’s product.21 The phrases 
“market for incorporations” and “market for corporate law” are interchangeable.22 Under 
US law, each state has its own statute of incorporations and so the act of choosing which 
state to incorporate in provides such a market.23 It is possible that the same mechanics apply 
intra-UK, and have resulted in the decline in the listing of Scottish companies on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
A market for incorporations requires both basic market conditions (demand from 
market participants and supply of different laws) and a legal framework (are there 
differences between the two jurisdictions?).24 The latter tells us whether the mechanics exist 
for a market for incorporation, the former whether market participants will actually use such 
a mechanism. We shall therefore explore whether this applies intra-UK. Given empirical 
evidence that Scottish headquartered companies are more likely to list using English legal 
vehicles, it seems some form of demand exists. Therefore, this article is focused on whether 
law provides supply for the market for incorporations (are there differences between English 
and Scottish company law?), and whether the legal framework exists. We shall also establish 
 
20 R Romano, “Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate 
Laws” (1989) 89 ColumLR 1599. 
21 R Romano, “Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1 
JLEcon&Org 225. 
22 See D S Schaffer, “Delaware’s limit on director liability: how the market for incorporation 
shapes corporate law” (1987) 10(3) HarvJL&PubPoly 665; O Bar-Gill, M Barziza and L 
Bebchuk “The Market For Corporate Law” (2006) 162(1) JITE 138. 
23 B H McDonnell, “Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law” (2007) 60 
SMULRev 383 at 422. Delaware is, by far, the most popular jurisdiction for incorporations, 
although most companies incorporated there are not headquartered in Delaware – see L A 
Bebchuk, “Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law” (1992) 105 HarvLR 1437 at 1443.  
24 L E Ribstein, “Delaware, Lawyers and Contractual Choice of Law” (1994) 19 DelJCorpL 
999 at 1007; B R Cheffins, Company Law Theory, Structure and Operation (2008) at 426; W 
L Cary “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83 YaleLJ 633.  
the likely transaction costs of any differences. This will help us explore whether transaction 
costs have driven such demand. In other words, we will explore whether comparatively high 
transaction costs can explain the decline in the Scottish listed company. The results present 
a clear picture. Transaction costs differences arising from known differences in company 
law are low. Differences arising from the implicit private law principles on which those 
known differences are based are higher. The highest transaction costs differences are those 
arising from the uncertainty of not knowing whether Scots law will follow English 
conceptions or extrapolate from Scots private law rules. A framework for the market for 
incorporations exists intra-UK, meaning that the concepts of the market for incorporations 
could explain the decline in the use of the Scottish corporate vehicle for listings. 
The next three Sections will explore the supply aspect of the market for incorporations. 
Section B explores basic concepts and known differences between English and Scots 
company law. Section C argues that one of these known differences, the difference in taking 
security over shares, arises because of an implicit difference in the nature of a share. Section 
D explores the Duomatic principle of company law, and argues that it may not apply in 
Scotland. The examples used in Sections C and D are illustrations of wider concepts. Having 
identified that there are differences between English and Scots law, and that utilising English 
law provides lower transaction costs, Section E explores whether the framework exists for 
a market for incorporation between the two jurisdictions. Section F concludes. 
B. SUPPLY: KNOWN DIFFERENCES 
Companies incorporated in both Scotland and England are governed by the same Act.25 
This approach is not unusual across commercial law. A raft of Scottish commercial law is 
based on a codifying statute that applies both to England and Scotland. Most of these 
 
25 Companies Act 2006 s 1. 
codifications occurred in the late Victorian era: particularly of note are partnership26 and 
sale of goods.27 These have long been criticised by Scottish commentators. T B Smith stated 
that they represented the “imposition of a foreign law” on Scotland.28 Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry provided the more nuanced statement that Scottish doctrinal considerations were 
ignored in the drafting of the relevant Acts.29 Certainly, the draftsman of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 considered it to codify existing law rather than to represent any idealistic 
statement as to what the law should be.30 For Scots law, however, its terms were 
innovations which changed the law. 
Comments about such codification statutes being based on English legal concepts and 
applied to Scots law without sufficient consideration still resound today.31 However, even 
within such codified statutes, there are differences in interpretation between the two statutes 
on subjects of universal application, even where the same provision applies.32 As such, 
English and Scottish company law being governed by the same Act does not preclude 
different laws applying. There are, of course, differences in the nature of these codifying 
 
26 Partnership Act 1890. 
27 Sale of Goods Act 1893; now repealed and ultimately replaced with the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. 
28 T B Smith, “Pretensions of English Law as ‘Imperial Law’”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 5 (1987) at paras 711 – 719, in particular the discussion of 
mercantile law developments in para 717. 
29 A F Rodger, “The codification of commercial law in Victorian Britain” 1992 LQR 570 at 
571. Rodger argues that unifying statutes were pushed by Scottish businessmen trying to create 
the ideal commercial environment for themselves, rather than having English law thrust upon 
them (at 572-582). 
30 M D Chalmers, “Codification of Commercial Law” (1902) 25 Annual Reports of the 
American Bar Association 282 at 283; M D Chalmers, “Experiment in Codification” (1886) 2 
LQR 125. 
31 For partnership, see L Macgregor “Partnership and legal personality: cautionary tales from 
Scotland” (2020) 20 JCLS 237 at 255; for sale of goods, see A Rahmatian, “Sale of Goods”, in 
I G MacNeil (ed) Scots Commercial Law (2014) at para 6.03. 
32 E.g. differences on the right of repair under Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 35 – which may arise 
in Scotland under a gratuitous contract - J&H Ritchie v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9; 2007 S.L.T. 
377 at [34]. This creates a difference between English and Scots law – see P Hood, “A stitch 
in time? Repairs and rejection in Sale of Goods” (2008) 12 EdinLR 316; J M Thomson, “A 
simple case? J&H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd, 2007 S.L.T. 377” [2007] JurRev 241 at 246. 
statutes from company law. The biggest difference is that they provided general statements 
of (in England) pre-existing law.33 On the other hand, for English law, original Companies 
Acts created a brand new type of legal entity.34 From a Scots law perspective, this meant 
that the codifying statutes supplanted existing laws.35 However, companies legislation was 
initially ignored in Scotland as Scottish partnerships already experienced separate legal 
personality. As such, early companies legislation had a bigger effect for English law than 
it did for Scots law.36 Accordingly, the disruption of existing laws caused by the codifying 
laws was greater in Scotland than the disruption caused by the companies legislation was. 
Nevertheless, the examples of partnership law and sale of goods law demonstrate that the 
mere presence of a single Act governing English and Scots law does not result in inevitable 
alignment of legal rules. Within company law, there has been a general convergence of 
known non-convergent areas: one major difference, registration of rights in security, 
converged in 2013.37 
Seven primary differences are known and acknowledged between the two jurisdictions. 
First, the rules for raising a derivative claim/procedure38 on behalf of a company against a 
wrongdoing director differ between English law and Scots law.39 Scots law requires two 
 
33 See F Pollock, “English Private Law 1879-1920” (1924) CambLJ 19 at 36. 
34 See S M Watson, “The Corporate Legal Person” (2019) 19 JCLS 137. 
35 See discussion in sources referenced in (n 28; n 29). 
36 See F Clark, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership and Joint-Stock Companies According 
to the Law of Scotland (1866) at 6; J Roberton Christie, “Joint Stock Enterprise in Scotland 
Before the Companies Acts” (1909-1910) 21 JurRev 128 at 129. 
37 See Companies Act 2006 ss 859A-859G; A D J MacPherson, “Registration of Company 
Charges Revisited: New and Familiar Problems” (2019) 23 EdinLR 153; H Patrick “Charges 
Changing” 2013 JLSS (February). 
38 J Armour, “Derivative actions: a framework for decisions” (2019) 135 LQR 412; D 
Kershaw, “The rule in Foss v Harbottle is dead: long live the rule in Foss v Harbottle” [2015] 
JBL 274. A derivative claim/procedure is the ability of shareholders to sue a wrongdoing 
director on behalf of the company, with any proceeds from such claim being received by the 
company rather than the suing shareholder.  
39 See Companies Act 2006 ss 260-264 for the English rules and ss 265-269 for the Scottish 
rules. 
court processes; English law one.40 This seems to cause higher transaction costs for 
Scotland. However, derivative claims are rarely used.41 This makes the procedure, and any 
transaction costs arising due to jurisdictional differences in its operation, very unlikely to 
be a driver of incorporation. Second, corporate insolvency rules are different.42 Recent 
reforms to Scottish rules, however, were designed to align to English rules as much as 
possible.43 Nevertheless, differences remain between the two insolvency regimes. For 
example, English law has a public body, the Official Receiver, which acts as a liquidator-
of-last-resort for a company.44 Scots law does not have a body which fulfils such a 
function.45 Similarly, whilst liquidators of English companies are clearly able to disclaim 
onerous contracts,46 liquidators of Scottish companies do not enjoy exactly the same right.47 
However, the main drivers for choice of incorporation are shareholders and directors.48 
These constituencies are least likely to receive a dividend on insolvency. They are therefore 
least likely to care about transaction costs arising in insolvency process.49 Accordingly, 
differences in transaction costs are likely to be irrelevant for a market for incorporation. 
 
40 D Cabrelli, “Statutory derivative proceedings in Scotland: a procedural impasse?” (2009) 
13 EdinLR 511; D Cabrelli, “Statutory derivative proceedings: the view from the Inner 
House” (2010) 14 EdinLR 116. 
41 A M Gray, “The statutory derivative claim: An outmoded superflousness?” (2012) 33 
CoLaw 295. 
42 See The Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, SI 2016/1024 for England and Wales 
and Insolvency (Scotland) (Receivership and Winding Up) Rules 2018, SI 2018/347 and 
Insolvency (Scotland) (Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administrations) Rules 2018, 
SI 2018/1082 in Scotland. 
43 D McKenzie-Skene, “’It’s the rules, Jim, but not as we know them’: the new Scottish 
corporate insolvency rules” (2019) 32(4) InsolvInt 153. 
44 Insolvency Act 1986, s 132; A Keay, McPherson & Keay’s Law of Company Liquidation, 
4th edn (2017) at para 8-126. 
45 See D McKenzie-Skene, Bankruptcy para (2017) at para 4-56. 
46 Insolvency Act 1986 s 178. 
47 See Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal Co Ltd, Noters [2013] CSIH 108; D P S Sellar, 
“When does the English liquidation regime govern land in Scotland?” [2017] SLT 195. 
48 F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991) at 
112. 
49 See M J White, “Corporate Bankruptcy” in P Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (1998) at 483; M J White, “Corporate Bankruptcy as a 
Third, the law of execution of documents by companies differs between English and 
Scots law.50 However, the relevant rules apply whenever a UK company (of any 
jurisdiction) executes a document governed by the relevant applicable law. Parties 
generally have flexibility to choose the governing law of their contractual relations, which 
tends to provide Scots law with a disadvantage.51 This flexibility has its limits,52 but applies 
regardless of incorporation. As such, any transaction costs caused by this difference would 
affect parties doing business in a jurisdiction,53 rather than driving jurisdiction of 
incorporation. Fourth, minor differences exist for duties of directors. Whilst under English 
law, directors have a duty to disclose any wrongdoing to the company,54 it seems unlikely 
that they do under Scots law.55 The relevant Scottish case has been criticised for aligning 
to English law more than was necessary, to the exclusion of Scots law principles which 
should have applied.56 This is a minor difference: if anything, it would make directors more 
likely to push for incorporation in Scotland rather than less, as they have one duty less 
under Scots law. Fifth, differences also exist in respect of remedies available to the 
company when faced with a breach of duty by a director. This is because the 2006 Act 
leaves such matters to the common law.57 As such, general differences between English 
and Scots contract law in respect of remedies are reflected in such remedies. For example, 
any preference by English courts to consider damages as the primary remedy will be 
 
Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings” (1994) 
10(2) JLEcon&Org 268. 
50 Companies Act 2006 ss43-47 for English law governed documents; Companies Act 2006 
s48 for Scots law governed documents; Bennett (n 5) at para 162. 
51 P S Hodge, “Does Scotland need its own Commercial Law?” (2015) 19 EdinLR 299; H L 
MacQueen, “Quo Vadis?” [2017] JurRev 9. 
52 e.g. Rangers Football Club plc, Noters [2012] CSOH 55. 
53 Hardman (n 1) at 52. 
54 Item Software (UK) Limited v Fassihi [2004] IRLR 928. 
55 Commonwealth Oil & Gas Company Limited v Baxter [2009] CSIH 75 at [82].  
56 N R Whitty, “The ‘No Profit from Another’s Fraud’ Rule and the ‘Knowing Receipt’ 
Muddle” (2013) 17 EdinLR 37. 
57 Companies Act 2006 s 178. 
reflected in the relevant company law remedy.58 Conversely, any preference by Scots courts 
to consider specific implement as the primary remedy59 will be reflected in the relevant 
company law. It is submitted that as the trigger for wrongdoing is (subject to point four 
above) the same between the two regimes, the disciplinary function of the regime is, 
ultimately, the same in England as in Scotland. As such, whilst differences as to preferred 
remedy, and quantification of remedy, are major between the two jurisdictions, their effect 
on choice of incorporation is likely to be minor.  
Sixth, the biggest difference is ease of taking security over shares. A fixed charge can 
be taken over shares in an English company by way of an equitable charge created by 
delivering a share certificate and stock transfer form.60 However, under Scots law it is 
necessary to complete the transfer in favour of the creditor to create a fixed security.61 The 
author’s 2017 article noted anecdotal evidence that this was driving contractual restrictions 
on corporate borrowers incorporating Scottish subsidiaries.62 Proposals have been created 
to modernise the law of taking security over shares by allowing the creation of a 
subordinated real right in shares.63 These proposals have received universal acclaim.64 This 
should resolve an area which “has been noticeably unsatisfactory, and has long been 
 
58 Morse et al (n 5) at para 8.3306. 
59 T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) at 854; A Smith, “Specific 
Ipmlement” in K G C Reid and R Zimmerman (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland vol 
2 (2000) at 195. Cf W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) at paras 
23-08 – 23-09. 
60 See R Goode and L Gullifer, Goode and Gullifer on Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 
6th edn (2017) at para 6.46; F Tregear, “Taking shares in companies as collateral: an 
uncalculated risk” (2016) 4 JIBFL 205. 
61 See J Hardman, “Scottish Share Pledges and recent legislative developments: Lessons for 
the Great Repeal Bill” [2018] JurRev 64; Enviroco v Farstad [2011] UKSC 16. 
62 Hardman (n 1) at 30-31. 
63 Report on Moveable Transactions (Scot Law Com No 249, 2017).  
64 A D J MacPherson, “The Future of Moveable Security in Scots Law? Comments on the 
Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Moveable Transactions” [2018] JurRev 98; J 
Hardman, “Three steps forward, two steps back: A view from corporate security practice of 
the Moveable Transactions (Scotland) Bill” (2018) 22 EdinLR 266. 
recognised as such”.65 The effect of this is limited to subsidiaries: and therefore not likely 
to affect listed companies, or parent companies generally.66 This therefore cannot, on its 
own, explain the drop in Scottish incorporated companies being listed in London. 
Seventh, whilst English law recognised the floating charge at common law,67 Scots law 
required a statutory intervention to do so.68 The author previously included the floating 
charge as part of the “debt” aspect of internal finance,69 but there are arguments that the 
floating charge is best seen as part of the jurisdiction’s corporate insolvency framework 
rather than as a right in security.70 Since its introduction, the floating charge has been 
contentious in Scots law.71 Differences exist at the margin – under English law it is possible 
to contractually vary the point in time at which the floating charge crystallises into a series 
of fixed charges,72 whereas in Scotland it is not.73 Similarly, an attempted fixed charge, 
which fails to meet the relevant property law requirements, can be recharacterised as a 
floating charge under English law,74 whereas under Scots law it cannot.75 Nonetheless, it is 
 
65 Grier (n 6) at para 1-29. 
66 See discussion in Hardman (n 7). 
67 See the historical discussion in Agnew v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 
28; R Pennington, “The genesis of the floating charge” (1960) 23 MLR 63. 
68 Carse v Coppen 1951 SC 233; Hardman (n 1) at 49 – 50; R B Jack, “The coming of the 
floating charge to Scotland: an account and an assessment” in D J Cusine (ed) A Scots 
Conveyancing Miscellany (1987). 
69 Hardman (n 1) at 49. 
70 A D J MacPherson, The Floating Charge (2020) at Ch 6; J Hardman, “Hohfeld and the 
Scots Law Floating Charge” in J Hardman and A D J MacPherson (eds) Floating Charges in 
Scotland: New Perspectives and Current Issues (forthcoming). 
71 See G L Gretton, “Should floating charges and receivership be abolished?” [1986] SLT 
(News) 325; D Cabrelli, “The case against the floating charge in Scotland” (2005) 9 EdinLR 
407. 
72 Cheng Han Tan, “Automatic crystallisation, de-crystallisation, and convertability of 
floating charge” [1998] Company Financial and Insolvecy Law Review 41; B Collier, 
“Conversion of fixed charge to a floating charge by operation of contract?” (1995) 4 
American Journal of Comparative Law 488. 
73 Hardman (n 1) at 49; MacPherson (n 70) at paras 3-12 – 3-16. Under Scots law, a floating 
charge attaches rather than crystallises. 
74 Spectrum Plus Ltd (In Liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41. 
75 Clark v West Calder Oil Co (1882) 9 R 1017; A J P Menzies, “Is the creation of a floating 
charge competent to a limited company registered in Scotland?” (1909) 21 JurRev 87. 
argued that the floating charge is functionally the same under the two jurisdictions.76 Major 
reforms, which would have created such a difference, have been proposed.77 It is now, 
though, thought that such changes will not be effected.78 As such, whilst differences exist 
between the two jurisdictions in the operation of the floating charge, they are minor and 
unlikely to incur significant transaction costs. Accordingly, of seven acknowledged 
differences between English and Scottish company law, all but one are minor. The material 
issue, difficulty in taking security over shares, is not a key driver of incorporation of parent 
companies. It therefore cannot explain why the Scottish corporate form is being eschewed 
for listings in London. As such, transaction cost differences arising under known 
differences between English and Scots company law cannot be said to drive jurisdiction of 
incorporation.  
C. SUPPLY: IMPLICIT DIFFERENCE 
However, the difference between England and Scotland in the law of moveable transactions 
reveals a wider, implicit difference: the nature of a share difers between English law and 
Scots law. Early English cases held that owning a share gave a shareholder an equitable 
right in the assets owned by the company.79 This was held not to be the case by the mid-
nineteenth century, with English law holding in the case of Borland’s Trustees v Steel 
Brothers that “A share is…an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various 
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rights contained in the contract”.80 The 2006 Act provides that shares are “personal property 
(or, in Scotland, moveable property)” – rather than heritage.81 
The Borland’s Trustees formulation remains the classic English law formulation.82 It 
seems somewhat lacking: it identifies that a share provides contractual rights which are 
based on a quantum of money, but the case held that it was not akin to holding a debt at all. 
In 1989, Pennington attempted to provide clarity on the issue, noting that analysis into the 
nature of a share “is something which textbooks have rarely attempted”.83 He went on to 
state that, whilst disappointingly vague, the conclusion to be reached was that shares are 
intangible moveable property which does not constitute a debt.84 Accordingly, for 
Pennington, there was a lack of clarity as to what a share was, but that did not matter for 
legal analysis. Owning a share provided its holder with some contractual rights, some 
proprietary rights and was not a debt. Ireland contends that this does not provide enough 
clarity, arguing that this definition results in shareholders being purely external to the 
company.85 
Thus we have a lack of conceptual clarity at the heart of what a share fundamentally is 
under English law. We also have a conclusion that, ultimately, a share provides a mixture 
of property and contractual rights.86 As such, owning a share provides its owner with a 
chose in action under English law.87 The Scots law equivalent is, of course, incorporeal 
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moveable property.88 The rules between the two are different – mostly arising from the fact 
that English law considers equity a distinct source of law.89 Gower’s Company Law, the 
leading UK company law text, states that upon delivery of a signed stock transfer form and 
share certificate from a seller to the buyer, and payment of the price to the seller, beneficial 
interest in the shares transfers from the seller to the buyer. As such “the seller then becomes 
a trustee for the buyer and must account to him for any dividends he receives and vote in 
accordance with his instructions”.90 Thus the share’s ownership is split into legal ownership 
(held by the seller) and beneficial ownership (held by the buyer). The practical importance 
of the transfer of the beneficial interest is that if the seller then becomes insolvent then the 
beneficial ownership in the property has already passed.91 This concept of beneficial 
ownership arises from the English rules regarding equity.92 This is an English law analysis 
rather than an analysis which is of universal application to Scots law and English law. It is 
arguable that this analysis is based on an English law concept of a constructive trust.93  
Scots law has occasionally recognised a constructive trust.94 However, to do so is 
uncomfortable. In particular, the terms of the Scots law of constructive trusts differ from 
English law.95 The Scots case of Stevenson v Wilson held that a constructive trust applied 
in the context of a share sale.96 It is on this basis that the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia 
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concludes that Scots law follows English law.97 However, this is fact specific, as that case 
had a particularly complicated and bad tempered background. There, a trustee of a 
sequestered estate had successfully reclaimed shares in a private company from a 
purchaser. This occurred because the initial transfer was challengeable under then-
applicable insolvency legislation. It caused considerable ill feeling due to the trustee’s 
allegedly defamatory statements.98 After the trustee recovered the shares, they then sold the 
same shares to the same purchaser. However, the articles in the underlying company gave 
the directors authority to refuse any share transfer.99 The directors exercised this authority. 
When the directors refused, the trustee refused to either return the sale proceeds or hand 
over dividends, and was consistent and resolute in such refusal.100 Both parties agreed that 
the “beneficial” interest had transferred to the purchaser as a result of the second sale.101 At 
first instance, Lord Salvesen refused to declare that the shares were held on trust by the 
seller generally. However, he did agree with the buyer’s suggestion that such shares should 
be held on trust by the seller for as long as the seller remained the registered holder of such 
shares. Lord Salvesen’s reason for such outcome was that the trustee’s own conduct meant 
that he “has himself entirely to blame”.102  
This judgment was upheld on appeal, but the Inner House changed the emphasis. They 
held that the seller’s remedy if the company refused to register the transfer was to annul the 
transaction by returning funds. Only because the seller refused to return the relevant funds 
was such a “quasi-trust” necessary.103 Accordingly, the Inner House held not that there was 
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a trust, but that the seller’s attitude resulted in them assuming a “quasi-trustee” role. Since 
then, courts have tried to minimise the role of Stevenson v Wilson. In 1932, Lord Moncrieff 
stated that the proposal that a trust was automatically created over shares when a contract 
was entered into and all steps other than registration were completed was “unsound”. This 
narrowed the importance of Stevenson v Wilson to “very special circumstances”.104 Lord 
Penrose agreed when Sharp v Thomson was decided in the Inner House.105 
Gretton states of Stevenson v Wilson, “if it is a case of constructive trust, [it] has been 
so distinguished and questioned by subsequent case-law that it is now, as they say, 
‘authority only on its own facts’”.106 We can therefore conclude that Stevenson v Wilson 
does not provide authority for a general rule of constructive trusts in share transfers under 
Scots law that aligns to English law. Instead, principles from Stevenson v Wilson only apply 
in exceptional circumstances.  
This is not surprising given Scots law’s unititular nature:107 the share is, at any time, 
either “owned” by the buyer or the seller. This means the agreement of the parties in 
Stevenson v Wilson that beneficial ownership had passed to the purchaser was inaccurate 
as a matter of law. As shares are a form of incorporeal moveable property under Scots law 
they are transferred by assignation.108 Scots law has long held that no special form of 
assignation is necessary.109 The general rule for assignations is that they are not completed, 
and ownership of the property in question does not pass to the buyer, until intimation.110 A 
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Scottish court once stated that English and Scots law “start from diametrically opposite 
bases” when it comes to the transfer of moveable property.111 
A transfer of shares cannot be completed until a form of instrument which can be 
stamped has been so stamped.112 Scots law does not acknowledge beneficial ownership as 
a concept per se, and its rules on a constructive trust over shares differ from English law. 
As a result, under Scots law the seller will (other than in unusual circumstances) remain the 
owner of all aspects of the relevant shares until such procedure has been complied with and 
the company’s internal register has been updated to reflect the transfer. This is coherent 
with the transfer of Scots heritable property,113 and also for Scots property law more 
widely.114 
This represents a considerable difference between English and Scots law on the 
intervening insolvency of the seller. Under English law, beneficial interest passes to the 
buyer upon closing and therefore intervening insolvency of the seller does not affect the 
buyer’s beneficial ownership. Under Scots law, however, all ownership remains with the 
seller until the company books are written up to reflect the transfer other than in exceptional 
circumstances. In Stevenson v Wilson, the Inner House’s preferred resolution was to 
provide the buyer with a personal right against the seller, not a real right in the asset.115 The 
only obligations on a seller are personal and do not create any form of actual trust. The 
matter is confused as the seller in Stevenson v Wilson was the trustee in bankruptcy, rather 
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than an unsequestrated person transacting.116 As the transfer of shares involves a time lag 
as HMRC processes stamp duty payment, this causes a structural flaw when acquiring 
Scottish shares.117 This affects the point in time at which the buyer obtains a real right in 
the asset. This differs between the two jurisdictions. Proposed amendments to assignations 
of incorporeal moveable property under Scots law are limited to assignation of claims. They 
expressly do not cover the transfer of shares118 and so will not affect this analysis. 
The Scots law approach creates higher transaction costs in buying shares, which is 
likely to affect the attractiveness of investing in the jurisdiction. Accordingly, explicit 
company law differences do not show large risks of transaction costs. However, the implicit 
concept which creates a key explicit difference places Scots law at a distinct disadvantage 
to English law.  
 
116 This narrows the importance of the real/personal rights distinction, as liabilities incurred by 
the trustee in bankruptcy (or sequestration) were and still are paid out of the estate in priority 
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buyer becoming a beneficiary of a quasi-trust and the buyer having a personal right against the 
seller would be vital. This may be responsible for the laxness in language in Stevenson v Wilson 
which still causes such confusion. Certainly, modern statements on the issue tend to highlight 
that the primary remedy is a personal right, and only if the transferor refuses to admit such 
personal right does the secondary remedy, some form of quasi-trust relationship, arise (see 
MacQueen and Lord Eassie, (n 81) at para 46.18). This is a valiant attempt to reconcile the 
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118 Report on Moveable Transactions, (Scot Law Com No 249, 2017) vol 1 at para 3.4. The 
pledge of shares in security is, of course, covered by the project – see vol 2 at ch 17 – 
however, this is obviously a different point to the actual transfer of shares. 
This example illustrates a wider difference – a number of areas of company law are 
based on private law concepts. Any differences between legal systems for these concepts 
unveils a further implicit difference. Indeed, this was how the fourth known difference 
arose.119 This issue is therefore widespread across company law wherever a company law 
concept derives from a private law concept which is different between English and Scots 
law. Scots law’s transaction cost disadvantage from such implicit differences is higher than 
was the case for explicit differences. As such, it is more likely that such implicit differences 
may drive the choice of incorporation.  
D. SUPPLY: UNCERTAIN DIFFERENCES 
In addition to known differences and implicit differences, there are some areas of company 
law which arise from English law jurisprudence. These create uncertainty as to whether 
Scots law fully aligns in such areas.  
For example, even though the nature of a share differs between the two jurisdictions, it 
does not seem as though methods of shareholder voting are. Procedures for written 
resolutions apply equally to England and Scotland,120 and rules pertaining to voting by 
proxy, special resolutions and ordinary resolutions are similarly uniform.121 All can be 
supplemented by the articles of association of the company. This applies equally to 
Scotland and England.122  
However, the Companies Act 2006 states that the rules set out do not affect 
any enactment or rule of law as to (a) things done otherwise than by passing a 
resolution, (b) circumstances in which a resolution is or is not treated as having been 
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passed, or (c) cases in which a person is precluded from alleging that a resolution 
has not been duly passed.123 
This is held to be a reference to the “Duomatic Principle”.124 This principle takes its 
name from In re Duomatic Ltd.125 
This principle effectively allows informal unanimous shareholder consent to equate to 
a formal resolution correctly passed. There were proposals to codify this principle in the 
Companies Act 2006,126 but no codification occured. It has been criticised as “a principle 
without form”, whose flexibilities are also its weaknesses.127 It has also been argued that 
the Duomatic Principle “sits uncomfortably alongside many of the central principles of 
company law”.128 More pertinently for our purposes, it is a particularly English construct.  
At first, it is difficult to identify the “English only” elements to the principle. Buckley 
J suggested a two stage analysis to a putative application of this principle – first, could the 
general meeting carry the matter in question into effect, and second, can it be shown that 
all shareholders have assented to such matter?129 The first question seems to be 
straightforward enough – a provision will be capable of being carried by the general 
meeting if the rule exists only to benefit the shareholders. Thus the Duomatic principle has 
been applied to ratification of breaches of directors' duties,130 approval of substantial 
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property transactions with directors,131 and establishment of a pension scheme for the 
directors which was not permitted by the articles.132 In each case, the relevant rule existed 
to protect shareholders and shareholders were therefore able to waive the related 
protections. Conversely, provisions for removing directors “at least in part” benefit the 
director, precluding the application of the Duomatic principle.133 Similar restrictions on 
unlawful dividends134 and alienating assets on insolvency135 existed for the benefit of 
creditors and so the Duomatic principle could not apply. 
However, at the margins there has been confusion as to the putative application of the 
principle. Such confusion is evidenced by the attempted application of the principle to the 
share buyback regime. This regime prevents companies from buying back their shares 
unless a series of tests are satisfied. Some of these tests are substantive (and exist to protect 
creditors by ensuring that the company will not become insolvent as a result of the buyback) 
and some are procedural (and exist to ensure shareholders actually make the decision). In 
R W Peak Ltd136 it was held that the Duomatic principle could never apply to any element 
of this regime, including the procedural element. Subsequent courts disagreed, stating that 
procedural provisions are purely for the benefit of shareholders.137 This directly 
contradicted R W Peak.  
This conflict is acknowledged. Behrens J acknowledged the conflict, but left its 
resolution to a case where such conflict would be determinative of the outcome.138 Such 
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conflict was determinative in Dashfield v Davidson.139 Here, McCahill J stated that it was 
a matter to be decided on a transaction-by-transaction basis.140 This is confused: it must be 
objectively possible to determine whether a provision is for the benefit of shareholders or 
not. 
The second question, whether all shareholders had shown their consent, also produces 
confused results. Whilst early cases proceed on the basis of unanimity,141 there are 
deviations. The court stated in respect of a meeting at which 98.7% of the members 
attended: “if I had to extend the [Duomatic P]rinciple to the extent necessary to do justice 
in this case, I would do so”.142 Similarly, the principle was initially successfully invoked 
by a 75% shareholder where the remaining shareholder had been liquidated.143 Once again, 
this shows confusion – is unanimity of shareholders required to invoke the Duomatic 
principle or not? 
Both circles can be squared by reconceptualising the Duomatic principle. In re Barry 
Artist Ltd144 the company petitioned for a reduction of capital despite all shareholders 
signing the same piece of paper rather than passing the required special resolution. Nourse 
J stated that other than this the petition was “unobjectionable and ought to succeed”.145 He 
was critical of the shareholders passing a written resolution (which was then an invalid way 
of making such decision) and only approved the reduction because there was evidence that 
it was time critical. He made it clear he would otherwise have refused the reduction.146 As 
such, the Duomatic principle becomes not a matter for the shareholders to apply, but one 
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for the court to apply in situations which it deems appropriate to do so. Neuberger J (as he 
then was) said of the principle in EIC v Phipps that its core was whether shareholders’ 
conduct made it “inequitable” to deny they had approved the transaction.147 
Barry Artist and EIC v Phipps clarify the Duomatic principle: it is a facet of the English 
doctrine of equity. It allows a court to review the transaction and establish whether it is 
equitable for the court to bless the transaction when faced with procedural irregularities. 
This English concept of equity allowed inconsistent application. This changes the nature of 
this principle: it is not a tool that the shareholders can use. Instead, it is a tool that the 
English courts can utilise to allow them to find a just outcome.  
All cases cited have been English cases. Duomatic has been cited in four Scottish cases, 
but was considered to be irrelevant in all without the requirement for any in depth 
analysis.148 As a result, we do not know how a Scottish court would treat an attempt to 
invoke the Duomatic principle. Indeed, viewing the Duomatic principle as an offshoot of 
equity causes a potential concern for a Scottish court. The unitary nature of Scots law makes 
equity much less important under Scots law than under English law.149 Thomson expressed 
the view that  
[i]t is surely the function of Parliament and not the Courts to determine where the 
balance between the general public interest and the interests of the individual should 
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be drawn. In these circumstances, the scope of equity in modern Scots law will 
become increasingly insignificant as a source of law.150 
Whitty provided that a key difference between the English and Scots law of equity was 
that under English law, equity gives effect to the court’s conscience, whereas under Scots 
law the remedy is “subordinate to the right”.151 This raises questions as to whether a 
Scottish court would even acknowledge the concept of the Duomatic principle in Scotland. 
After all, the cases which have applied, or not applied, the Duomatic principle have done 
so effectively on the grounds of providing vent to the conscience of the court.  
When faced with an attempt to invoke the Duomatic principle, a Scottish court has three 
fundamental options. First, it could follow the approach outlined above by Grier’s 
Company Law and follow the English jurisprudential path, ignoring that it relies so heavily 
on equitable concepts. However, given that the presence of these equitable principles means 
that there is no clear definitive and objective test for the Duomatic principle, it is difficult 
to establish the way in which a Scottish court would do so. Second, it could decide that the 
Duomatic principle relies so heavily on English equitable principles that it does not have 
any place in Scots law. Third, it could attempt to interpret the case law through Scots law 
principles. We cannot tell which of these three routes a Scottish court would take.  
Should the court adopt the second or third routes, there would be a difference between 
the application of the Duomatic principle in Scotland compared to England. Although we 
cannot state definitively that this difference exists, there is a potential for this difference to 
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exist. We will only know whether it does when a Scottish court attempts to discern 
objective rules contained in English caselaw – rooted as it is in English equity.  
This potential for difference makes Scots law unattractive, and therefore makes 
Scotland unattractive as a jurisdiction of incorporation. The Duomatic principle saves the 
costs of requiring formality in corporate affairs, which can save transaction costs. Should 
Scots law not follow it, then transaction costs would be higher for Scottish companies than 
English companies. However, this uncertainty is a transaction cost in itself.152 It is likely to 
be an unattractive feature for investment in Scottish companies.153 Sadly, a lack of certainty 
as to the precise ambit of legal terms is endemic under Scots private and commercial law.154 
So long as such uncertainty persists as to whether Scots law follows the English rules or 
provides its own (as yet unknown) rules, avoidable uncertainty exists in Scottish company 
law. This uncertainty will discourage potential market participants from utilising the 
Scottish corporate form, and could well be a driver for decline in the use of the Scottish 
corporate form by a listed company. This uncertainty is, once again, endemic across 
company law in Scotland. It exists in some form whenever the rules arise from, or are 
interpreted by, equitable principles. Equity underpins most of English law’s 
conceptualisation of company law – from responsibilities of directors,155 the role of, and 
remedies available to, shareholders,156 and even the approach the courts will take to 
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piercing the corporate veil.157 Accordingly, the transaction cost disadvantage of uncertainty 
as to Scots commercial law affects the majority of company law.  
How does this square with the conception that academics consider company law to be 
unitary? Market participants are more familiar with English law generally,158 and most 
major Scottish law firms have now been bought by English equivalents.159 As such, market 
actors have more certainty as to English company law. Mergers and lack of underlying 
certainty mean law firms are unlikely to be able to provide a definitive legal opinion160 as 
to the content of Scots company law. This lack of certainty alone is likely to discourage 
Scottish businesses from utilising Scottish companies. A normative hope that Scottish 
courts try to align to English company law161 does not translate to descriptive, doctrinal 
certainty that Scottish courts will follow English law precedent based on English private 
law principles. Non-legal uncertainty could produce the same result. Thus political 
uncertainty in Scotland arising from Brexit162 or IndyRef2163 could also have caused a 
decline in Scottish incorporated companies being listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
E. FRAMEWORK 
We have identified that there are differences between English and Scottish company law. 
Some differences are express, some are implicit, and there is uncertainty as to whether 
certain rules align between the two jurisdictions. This is, however, not sufficient to argue 
that the decline in Scottish companies being listed in London arises due to a market for 
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company law. For such a market to exist, there must be a link between any such different 
laws and the jurisdiction of incorporation of the company. This link between “jurisdiction 
of incorporation” and “governing law” is inherent in the initial literature on the market for 
company law, which arose primarily relating to incorporation taxes.164 However, the 
market for incorporation literature expanded to explore more fundamental concepts of 
company law.165 This literature was all predicated on the inherent link between jurisdiction 
of incorporation and governing law.This was most commonly expressed in the notion that 
Delaware corporate law applies to (and only to) all Delaware corporations.166 Thus there is 
no market for company law if participants are able to freely choose the applicable company 
law at any time. If participants in a Scottish incorporated company can choose English 
company law to govern their interactions, or if Scots law applies Scots law to all companies, 
and English law vice versa, regardless of their jurisdiction of incorporation, there is no 
market for incorporations. Accordingly, for the framework for a market for company law 
to have a real potential to exist, each of English and Scots law must apply the laws of its 
incorporation to each company. 
The governing law of shares is determined on a lex situs basis.167 Establishing the lex 
situs is conceptually difficult because “owning a share” embodies many related rights 
which are difficult to disaggregate.168 To avoid different laws applying to different aspects 
of share ownership, the lex situs of a share is normally stated to be the law of the company’s 
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jurisdiction of incorporation, but it could be where the share register is kept.169 This is moot 
intra-UK, as the register of members must be kept either at the registered office of the 
company170 or at a single alternative inspection location.171 Both of these must be in the 
same jurisdiction as the company’s jurisdiction of incorporation.172 A UK company is 
domiciled in its jurisdiction of incorporation.173 A UK company cannot be re-incorporated 
elsewhere without incurring the cost of liquidation and creating a new entity.174 
Accordingly, the lex situs of shares under the Companies Act 2006 is linked to jurisdiction 
of incorporation: shares in Scottish companies are governed by Scots law and shares in 
English companies are governed by English law. Such an analysis is coherent and follows 
wider decisions as to choice of laws which have enabled global trade.175 For our purposes, 
though, it means that a framework exists for a market for incorporation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This article set out to explore whether any legal rules could be responsible for the decline 
in Scottish companies being listed on the London Stock Exchange. It has identified that 
express differences have low transaction cost disadvantages for Scots law. However, these 
express differences are based on more implicit and fundamental conceptions that result in 
wider transaction cost deltas. The implicit difference between English and Scots law is 
 
169 Macmillan v Bishopsgate. See J M Carruthers, The transfer of property in the conflict of 
laws (2005) at para 1-38; M Ooi, Shares and other securities under the Conflict of Laws (2003) 
at para 2-05. 
170 Companies Act 2006 s 114(1). 
171 Companies Act 2006 s 1136(1) and Companies (Company Records) Regulations 2008, SI 
2008/3006 para 3. 
172 Companies Act 2006 s 114(1)(a), s 114(1)(b) and Companies (Company Records) 
Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3006 para 3(a) respectively. 
173 Lord Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edn (2018) 
at para 30-002. 
174 Companies Act 2006 s 9(2); Collins et al (n 173) at para 30-003. 
175Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works [1906] 1 KB 49 at 56; Pickering v Stephenson (1872) L.R. 
14 Eq. 322. 
predicated on differences in private law between the two jurisdictions. Uncertainty as to 
whether English and Scots company law entirely align also arises from different approaches 
to private law.  
Scots law provides that the “creation, operation, operation, regulation and dissolution 
of types of business association” are matters reserved for the UK Parliament.176 However, 
private law is devolved to the Scottish Parliament.177 This includes all private law concepts 
outlined in this article. This means that it will become possible, by changing private law, 
for the Scottish Parliament to indirectly change company law. Such devolved areas are 
likely to diverge from English equivalent rules over time.178 It is therefore likely that more 
doctrinal differences arise over time. This is likely to be more pressing for Scots courts, as 
they have to navigate between the Scylla of coherence to Scots private law principles at the 
expense of UK wide company law, and the Charybdis of coherence of UK wide company 
law to the exclusion of application of Scots private law principles. Indeed, it could be stated 
that these two aims will constantly be in tension within Scottish company law. Scottish 
courts have generally struggled to find a neat solution to this conundrum in the context of 
company law.179 
The issue has become even more pressing. Scottish corporate forms have become less 
attractive for listing in London.180 This article has found no “smoking gun” reason for this. 
However, it has identified that known differences between English and Scots company law 
create minor transaction cost disadvantages for Scots law, that the implicit differences these 
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are built upon create greater transaction cost disadvantages, and that uncertain differences 
create the biggest transaction cost disadvantages. Unfortunately, such uncertainty is 
endemic across Scots company law. A framework for a market for incorporations exists. It 
seems that market participants are using this market – if Scots company law is to avoid 
falling further behind, it needs greatly clarity, and it needs it now. 
 
